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Taxation of the
Insurance Industry
Martin F. Grace and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez

IN SU R A N C E TAXATION
In t r o d u c t i o n
This ch ap ter exam ines the insurance industry, its contribution to the
Ohio econom y, an d issues in the taxation o f the O hio insurance industry.
Insurance is a very im p o rtan t service provided in the econom y, and because
of its special n atu re it is often taxed differently than o th er types of co rpora
tions and even o th e r financial service firms.
Table 12-1 com pares the insurance industry with others in the state and
shows th at the insurance industry pays m ore in prem ium and capital and su r
plus taxes than the banking industry pays in n et worth taxes. T he insurance
tax accounts for approxim ately 26 percent of corporate franchise taxes (in 
cluded insurance taxes, corporate n et incom e and net w orth tax, and finan
cial institutions taxes). In com parison, the m anufacturing sector pays
approximately the sam e am ount as the insurance industry, while the service
sector pays about 5.5 percen t of business taxes. The insurance industry e m 
ploys slightly m ore p eople than the banking sector, while contributing about
the same am ount to state GDP. Thus, the insurance industry is an im portant
part of O h io ’s tax stru ctu re as well as the sta te ’s economy.
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TABLE 12-1
Relative Im portance of In su ran ce Industry
Relative to O th e r In d u stries in O hio

Industry

T o ta l Taxes
paid
to Dept. Of
Taxation (1992)
(M illion S)

Percent of
Total
C o rp o ratio n
T axes Paid
(1992)*

Total N um ber
o f Employees

A verage Wage

Percent of Ohio
GDP
(1989)

Insurance*

277.1

25.80

90,300

S32.064

1.73

Banking'

157.9

15.56

87,200

$24,900

1.86

Services

60.2

5.6

1,490,700

$21,770

1696

Manufacturing

282.6

26.31

1,278.500

$33,943

27.53

Corporations

630.1

58.65

—

—

-

Sources: Ohio Bureau o f Employment Services. U.S. Dept of Labor. Bureau o f Labor Statistics, Employment and
Earnings (1993); Ohio Department o f Taxation, and U.S . Dept o f Commerce. Survey o f Current Business
'Includes all corporation net income and net worth taxes, financial institution taxes, and insurance premium taxes.
•Premium Taxes only
f in a n c ia l Institution Taxes Only

P e r f o r m a n c e o f O h i o ’s I n s u r a n c e I n d u s t r y
In 1993 the state o f O hio was hom e to 47 life insurance com panies and
165 property-liability com panies. This num ber has changed dramatically
over time. O ver the last 30 years a num ber o f com panies have domesticated
in O hio. T he increase in the num ber of property and liability companies oc
cu rred after 1979, while the life industry experienced growth until the mid
dle 1970s and then stabilized.1 T he hom e office of an insurance company
contains m ost o f the com pany’s em ploym ent base as well as its operations
base. Thus, obtaining and retaining hom e offices would increase employ
m ent and econom ic developm ent in O hio.2 W heaton (1986) found that
sta te s’ tax policy can penalize the dom estic industry in term s of future
grow th of the industry. T hus, it is im portant to m ake sure that there is a full
understan d in g o f the effects o f all incom e tax policies and how they interact
to effect em ploym ent and grow th o f the sta te ’s insurance industry.

In d u stry B r ea k d o w n
Property and Liability. T he O hio property and liability insurance industry
is m ade up o f approxim ately 800 com panies selling insurance for auto,
hom eow ner, com m ercial, liability, and o th er coverages. In 1992 approxi
m ately 50,000 p eo p le w ere em ployed in the property-liability insurance in
dustry in O hio. O f these, 165 w ere dom estic com panies, accounting for 5
p e rc en t of prem ium s w ritten in 1992.
Life. T he life insurance industry includes 695 com panies writing group and
individual life insurance. T hese firms em ploy approximately 20,000 people in
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Ohio. Life insurance is actually two products: one for savings, and one for
indemnity in case o f death. Since there is a savings com ponent, it is very im 
portant that tax policy be structured to be consistent with other savings
products. To the extent th ere is different tax treatm ent betw een the savings
component o f a life insurance product and the savings com ponent o f some
other financial contract, the sta te ’s tax policy could bias or reduce the
amount o f savings w ithin the state. O f the approxim ately 695 com panies
writing business in O hio, 47 are dom estic com panies. T hese com panies ac
count for 13 p ercen t o f the life business w ritten in Ohio.
Other. In addition to accident and health insurance w ritten by life insur
ance com panies o r by traditional property-liability com panies, there are a
number o f o th er providers o f health coverage. T here are Blue Cross/Blue
Shield providers in O hio.3 T hese com panies are now classified as dom estic
mutual property-liability com panies. In 1991 they accounted for $1,885 bil
lion in subscriber prem ium s, representing 21 percent of the non-life prem i
ums (excluding H M O s) in O hio. In addition, there are a num ber of health
maintenance organizations (H M O s), with $1,755 billion in prem ium s in
1991.4 T hese com panies can elect an exem ption from the prem ium tax in ex
change for open enro llm en t5 and com m unity rating.6 However, open enroll
ment and com m unity rating are potentially very costly and not many H M O s
elect this exem ption.
T here are also a num ber o f fraternal insurance com panies. These com 
panies provide coverage to m em bers o f certain fraternal organization, such
as the Knights of C olum bus or the A lliance of Transylvanian Saxons. In
Ohio there are 14 dom estic fratem als and 63 foreign fraternals. In 1991,
these com panies accounted for 3.15 percent of total prem ium s w ritten in the
life insurance industry in O hio.

C U R R E N T ST R U C T U R E OF O H IO ’S
IN SU R A N C E TAX
H is t o r y o f I n s u r a n c e T a x a t io n
Historically, insurance prem ium s are taxed, rath er than notions o f in
come. This has been done for one m ajor reason: simplicity. T he calculation
of net incom e for an insurance com pany is conceptually quite difficult as
premiums are collected now, but losses are not realized until a num ber of
periods henceforth. Thus, there is difficulty in determ ining net income.
Reserves set up for future liabilities appear as income to the tax collector.
Even if the tax collector understands the special nature of the insurance co n 
tract, the tax collector and the insurer m ust agree on an appropriate in ter
est rate to discount the reserves to calculate net income for the current year.
In addition, even if the reserves are discounted, one may question the ap 
propriateness of taxing reserves. This is because the reserves are the finan
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cial capital backing future losses. State solvency regulatory policy requires
th at the com panies keep higher reserves than they might otherwise keep to
reduce the risk o f insolvency, and thus com panies with the required reserves
would pay m ore taxes than those which did not keep the required reserves.
Because o f these problem s, and the fact that a m ethod o f properly dis
counting the reserves was not available w hen insurance com panies first be
cam e taxable, a sim ple solution o f taxing prem ium s was developed. In fact,
this is the pred o m in an t m ethod for taxing insurance com panies worldwide.
H ow ever, its use has been strongly criticized, and a responsible state should
recognize the im plications o f the prem ium tax for the long run viability of
the industry.7

St r u c t u r e o f t h e T axes
Premium tax and franchise tax. C om panies writing in O hio are taxed based
on the o f 2.5 percent o f th eir gross direct prem ium s w ritten (prem ium tax)
and 0.6 percent o f capital and surplus (franchise tax) if they are an Ohio do
m esticated (o r c h artered ) com pany.8 If the com pany is a foreign company
(o r com panies ch a rte red outside the state of O hio) the insurer is taxed 2.5
p ercen t of prem ium s less retu rn prem ium s paid for cancellations and con
siderations received for re-insurance o f risks within O hio.9 In addition, for
eign insurers, if they provide dividends to policyholders can deduct these
policyholder dividends if the dividend is in excess of the net cost of insur
an ce.10 T he dom estic tax on the m inim um basis o f 0.6 percent o f capital and
surplus o r two and one-half percent of direct prem ium s w ritten allows small
com panies with small capital and surplus (net w orth) to be taxed at a rela
tively low rate. As the com pany grows and has increasing contributions to
capital and surplus, the com pany pays the prem ium tax if it is less than the
capital and surplus tax.
Box 12-1 shows the schem atic for the dom estic insurer for determining
which tax to pay: the prem ium tax, which is based on gross prem ium s, or the
capital and surplus tax, which is based on a statutory definition of capital and
surplus. N ote th at this statutory definition includes excess reserves, certain
policy holder dividends not paid out, certain reinsurance, and non-admittcd
assets. From this th ere is a deduction for ow nership o f stock in O hio insur
ance subsidiaries. For foreign com panies, the tax base is direct written pre
m ium s net o f policy holder dividends.
Based on cu rren t law approxim ately 45 percent o f the dom estic life in
dustry pays a capital and surplus tax while 65 percent of the property indus
try pays a capital and surplus tax.
M ore property-liability com panies pay the capital and surplus tax
F urther, the property-liability com panies paying the capital and surplus tax
account for alm ost 70 percen t of dom estic prem ium s. This contrasts sharply
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BOX 12-1
In su rer pays the minim um of the two taxes
2.5% G ross Prem ium s 0.6% o f Capital & Surplus
C apital & Surplus =
Excess Reserves
+ Statutory Reserves
+ Policy H older Dividends
+ C ertain Reinsurance
+ N on-adm itted Assets
— C om m on Stock O w ned in O hio Subs

with the experience in the dom estic life industry, which accounts for only 6.0
percent o f the prem ium s. Finally, as com pared to the industry’s m edian
asset size, the property-liability com panies are relatively larger than those
companies paying capital and surplus taxes in the life industry.

E x e m p t io n s a n d O m is s io n s f r o m t h e T a x B a s e
Health premiums by HMOs. H ealth insurance prem ium s sold by life and
health insurance com panies and property-liability com panies are treated
similarly to o th e r insurance. However, the Blue Cross/Blue Shield com pa
nies are subject to different capital and surplus requirem ents for regulatory
solvency purposes than the rest o f the industry, and are thus m ore able to
take advantage o f the low er tax afforded by the capital and surplus franchise
tax.11

Some states provide som e portion o f the health insurance industry with
tax advantages.12 This may reduce the cost o f insurance to the consum er as
no prem ium tax is paid. A state may desire to prom ote the consum ption of
health insurance by reducing its cost through lower taxation.1-' In O hio this
is partially accom plished through the fact that the Blues can take advantage
of their special status and pay the franchise tax rather than the prem ium tax.
However, for horizontal equity purposes state policy should treat all health
insurance providers similarly.
As p art of O h io ’s health care policy, H M O s arc potentially exempt from
the prem ium tax. In return, the H M O s agree to have open enrollm ent and
employ com m unity, ra th e r than individual ratings for prem ium determ in a
tion. T here are a num b er o f issues with regard to this policy. The first con
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cerns horizontal equity. O th e r types o f health insurance providers do pay the
prem ium o r franchise tax. This provides an incentive for the potential in
sured to choose an H M O plan over an insurance plan. A second issue con
cerns w hether H M O s are insurance com panies subject to a premium tax.
H M O s, if n o t associated with an insurance company, may actually pay the
co rp o rate franchise tax ra th e r than the insurance tax. This may provide the
H M O s w ith a tax benefit.
Table 12-2 shows the size o f the H M O population in the state of Ohio.
T h e percen tag e o f individuals in H M O s will likely increase in the future.
T hus, the poten tial exists for a dim inishing of the sta te ’s prem ium tax or
franchise tax base from traditional health insurance.
In 1991, the loss in prem ium tax revenue if all H M O s had paid the 2.5
p ercen t prem ium tax w ould have been $47.6 million while the loss would
have been approxim ately $2.4 million if all H M O ’s had paid the franchise
tax. T h e H M O industry w ould pay if taxed like o th er insurers, something in
betw een as th ere are som e foreign H M O s operating in O hio and there are
som e large O hio H M O s.
As Figure 12-1 shows, H M O prem ium s have increased over the last 12
years. A s th e prem ium s increase due to individuals and groups leaving tra
ditional insurance policies and switching to HM Os, the loss in term s of tax
revenue increases. H ow ever, the benefit o f having m ore O hioans insured
may be w orth the cost in term s of lost tax revenue and the distortion of the
com petitive m arket. If this is true, it m akes sense to provide this tax break
to all providers of health coverage irrespective o f organizational form in ex
change for less restrictive underw riting practices.14
Annuity Considerations. A nnuity considerations are not taxed in Ohio. A
n um ber of states, however, do tax these contracts.15 T he majority of states

TABLE 12-2
H M O E nrollm ent over Time

Enrollment

Percent o f
Ohio Pop

Year

N o. o f HMOs

1989

34

1,294,173

11.9

1990

34

1,454,020

13.3

1991

34

1,445,891

13.2

1992

39

1,778,500

16.3

Source: Health Insurance Association o f America, Source Book of
Health Insurance Data (1990-1993).
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FIGURE 12-1. H M O premiums over time.

do not tax annuities, and the federal governm ent also treats annuities dif
ferently, exem pting qualified pension plans from current income taxation.
This is because annuities are thought to be savings vehicles for retirem ent,
and the federal policy is to encourage retirem ent savings. A state that does
not tax c u rren t annuity considerations is acting consistently with the federal
policy, but unlike the federal governm ent, a state that exem pts annuity con
siderations from cu rren t taxation is not able to collect taxes when the an n u 
ity is paid.
Some states tax annuities, but exem pt considerations paid to qualified
plans.16 So, if an annuity is used to fund a retirem ent savings program , then
it is exem pt; otherw ise it is subject to the prem ium tax. To gauge the size of
the revenues that could be obtained: if O hio w ere to tax all annuity consid
erations it could expect to receive an additional $41,900,000 in prem ium tax
receipts, which would account for alm ost 15 percent of cu rren t prem ium tax
revenues.17
A tax on annuities is a tax on savings and, for horizontal equity reasons,
a tax m ust be put on o th e r savings m ethods if one is placed on annuity co n 
sideration. Savings are arguably not the p ro p er subject o f taxation as this is
the source of the econom y’s investm ent and future consum ption op p o rtu n i
ties. Thus, a tax on savings, especially if out-of-line with o th e r states would
reduce savings and potentially im pair econom ic developm ent.
Workers' Compensation. W orkers’ com pensation prem ium s are also o m it
ted from the O hio tax base, because w o rkers’ com pensation insurance is
provided by a state-ru n m onopoly. States have different policies on how the
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w orkers’ com pensation m ark et operates. Some states believe that competi
tion will bring about low er rates while others, such as Ohio, believe that a
state-ru n en terp rise will serve the b e tte r business of O hio. Because workers’
com pensation can be a very expensive insurance, the state could decide to
provide the insurance free o f tax to the business in O hio. Currently, approx
im ately $2 billion o f business is w ritten in w orkers’ com pensation insurance
prem ium s and not taxed.

F ir e M a r s h a l l T a x
Property-liability com panies are also subject to a Fire Marshall Tax.
which is 0.75 percen t and is applied against the p roportion of property-lia
bility prem ium s th a t cover fire hazards. This percentage differs depending
on the line o f insurance w ritten. For exam ple, fire insurance is categorized
as 100 percent fire coverage, auto insurance is categorized as 10 percent fire
coverage, and health insurance is categorized as 0 p ercen t fire coverage.18
In 1992 the fire m arshall tax collected $6.3 million in revenue, which is
used to fund the Office o f the State Fire M arshall. T he fire marshall tax has
been volatile over the d ecad e of the 1980s, and the growth in revenues seems
to be trending downwards. T he most im portant item to note, however, that
it is com bined with th e prem ium tax, and thus the real effective rate of tax
ation on fire related coverage is potentially g reater than 2.5 percent. For ex
am ple, including the prem ium tax and the fire m arshall tax, the effective rate
on large dom estics and foreign com panies can be as high as 3.25 percent.

R e t a l ia t o r y T a x e s
Insurance taxation am ong the states is unique because of the interrela
tionship betw een the taxation policies of the states. Because Congress
gran ted the states com plete authority over the regulation and taxation of the
insurance industry, subject to relatively m inor constraints, states authorize
w hat has been called “ retaliatory taxation.”19 T he system of retaliatory tax
ation seem s com plex, but in its sim plest term s says that if another state taxes
O h io ’s com panies a t a higher rate than O hio does, th en com panies in those
high-tax states m ust pay to O hio the prem ium tax plus a tax based on the
am oun t of the difference in the taxes. For example, A labam a taxes Ohio
com panies o p eratin g in th a t state at 4.00 percent of prem ium s if they cover
A labam a risks. Thus, an A labam a com pany w riting business in Ohio pays
the O h io prem ium tax at the rate of 2.5 percent of direct premiums, and an
additional tax o f 1.5 percen t, which is the difference betw een the rate that
an O hio com pany w ould pay in A labam a and the rate applicable in Ohio.
Similarly, O h io com panies would pay retaliatory taxes to other states if the
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Ohio rate is g reater than the sta te ’s own rate. For example, O hio com panies
writing in Illinois pay th e Illinois prem ium tax of 1 percent plus an additional
1.5 percent in retaliatory taxes to Illinois, because Illinois insurers operating
in Ohio would have to pay 2.5 percent to Ohio.
One o f the ideas behind the retaliation was to reduce the incentive for
states to charge out-of-state com panies extremely high rates. Many states
discriminate against out-of-state com panies in their prem ium tax rates.20
This discrim ination is legal as long as it passes the equal protection clause’s
rational basis test.21
The retaliatory tax reduces the net effect of this freedom to tax foreign
companies. As the ra te to foreign com panies increases, the rate that the
state’s own dom estics m ust pay to o th e r states also increases.22 This has the
potential for m aking a sta te ’s own com panies less com petitive in other
states’ m arkets. T h e higher the state’s own rate and the bigger the state ’s
companies are in th e national m arket, the m ore taxes the state’s com panies
pay to o th e r jurisdictions and the less com petitive the com pany is relative to
companies in low-tax states. This, in turn, has effects on the local economy.
As the percent o f revenues being paid to oth er states increases due to the
home sta te ’s tax policy, the less viable is the state’s own industry and the
lower the em ploym ent opportunities th ere will be in the hom e state’s indus
try. Thus, a change in the prem ium tax rate can have a significant effect on
the hom e sta te ’s industry even though the hom e state tax revenues do not
change much. M ore o f the fiscal effect of this unique tax interrelationship
will be shown in the sim ulation below.
The retaliatory tax was put in place by the states to keep o ther states from
raising taxes from foreign com panies. As a state’s rate becom es significantly
greater than the average rate am ong the states, the sta te ’s own com panies
start paying m ore to o th e r jurisdictions. However, there is another side to
this coin that can be em ployed to O h io ’s advantage. Since a relatively large
percentage o f the O hio insurance m arket is served by out-of-state com pa
nies, O hio could reduce its rate below the national average and becom e a re
cipient o f significant retaliatory tax revenues. In addition, as the rate
decreases, the dom estics receive a benefit from a lower effective rate versus
the foreign com panies who now m ust pay a retaliatory tax to Ohio. Thus, re
moving the explicit, and perhaps unconstitutional dom estic tax, replacing it
with a low, but equal tax rate on all com panies, O hio can end up with a con
stitutional tax p reference th at can stim ulate the insurance industry in the
state.

In addition, to the prem ium tax, o th e r license fees and assessm ents are
also subject to inclusion in the retaliatory tax. This includes assessm ents for
the insolvency funds. T he insolvency funds are set up as an ex-post insol
vency financing m echanism . If a com pany becom es insolvent, the fund taxes
the insurers based on their m arket share to pay off the O hio liabilities.
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T hese insolvency assessm ents are also included in the retaliatory tax calcu
lation in a small nu m b er o f states.23

F o r e ig n V e r s u s D o m e s t ic T r e a t m e n t
Figure 12-2 shows th a t th e ratio o f dom estic to foreign prem ium s has in
creased over tim e. T h e dom estic industry in 1969 rep resented about four
p ercent of the total industry’s tax contributions. T he increase in the early
1980s is the direct result o f an increase in the capital surplus franchise tax
rate. Since the 1991 increase, the percentage has been relatively stable. By
1993 th e dom estic industry was paying approxim ately 20 percent of the pre
m ium tax. In contrast, in term s o f gross prem ium s w ritten, the domestic in
dustry w rote approxim ately 54 percent. This is a n o th e r indication of the
distribution o f th e tax b u rd en tow ards out-of-state com panies.
A n u m b er of states provide some tax breaks solely to dom estic com pa
nies. T h ese tax breaks are generally o f two forms: a rate reduction for in
vestm ent in certain state assets, o r an outright distinction betw een foreign
and dom estic com panies. O h io ’s law, in contrast, is unique. For the first type
o f preference, a com pany can reduce its prem ium tax rate if it invests in state
securities or had a relatively high percentage of its assets invested within the
state. A labam a, A rkansas, G eorgia, and Texas, for exam ple, have laws like
this. A lthough there is no explicit foreign versus dom estic distinction in the
law, for practical purposes, only small dom estics are able to take advantage
o f the rate reduction, as a large nationw ide com pany could not be expected
to invest enough assets in one state to obtain a tax reduction.

1969

1973

1977

1981

1985

1989

Source: Ohio Department of Revenue. Annual Report (1992).

FIGURE 12-2. Premium tax collections (foreign and domestic).

1993
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O ther states, like Illinois, tax foreign com panies differentially higher be
cause the regulators argue that foreign com panies are m ore difficult to reg
ulate for solvency purposes. O th e r states that employed the discrim inatory
tax as a m ethod o f protecting their dom estic industry from interstate com 
petition have eith er scrapped the differentiation as a result of the Suprem e
Court’s ruling in Metropolitan v. Ward o r have attem pted, like Illinois, to p ro 
vide a rational basis.
A breakdow n o f the effective tax rates by foreign and dom estic com pa
nies in 1992 shows th a t the dom estics do benefit from the lower capital and
surplus tax (especially for the dom estic property-liability com panies). This is
shown in Table 12-3. T he largest beneficiaries here are in the property-liability industry. O f the dom estic industry a large p roportion is m ade up of
Blue Cross/Blue Shield prem ium s. Because of the B lues’ ability to use a
smaller capital and surplus tax base for regulatory reasons, they tend to reap
relatively large benefits from the use of the capital-surplus tax.
A question th at needs to be addressed is w hether the benefits of this tax
break are g reater than the costs. O ne benefit may be that there are m ore
small com panies available to provide insurance. However, since there are
economies of scale in the provision of insurance, these small com panies are
not likely to be able to reap the benefits of scale econom ies that would allow
them to com pete effectively with larger com panies. Thus, the differential
taxation may enable potentially inefficient com panies to stay in business.
Oth er F ees
There are a num b er of im portant licensing and exam ination fees paid by

TABLE 12-3
1991 O hio Insurance Effective Tax Rate
for Foreign and D om estic C om panies

E ffective T a x R a te
(In P e rcen t)
Life and Health

P roperty - Liability

Dom estic

1.28

Foreign

1.80

Dom estic

0.87

Foreign

2.11

Source: A uthors' calculation from Ohio D epartm ent o f Insurance Annual Report (1992) Note:
Tax base fo r com parison purposes is gross prem ium s written. HM O prem ium s and retaliatory
taxes paid to o th er states are excluded.
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the industry for regulatory purposes. A gents o f a com pany have a $20 license
fee, and regulatory exam inations are also charged to the firm. In 1992, these
fees am o u n ted to over $19 million. T he corresponding regulatory expendi
tu res w ere $12.6 million. T hus, the licenses and fees m ore than pay for the
regulation o f th e industry.
G u a r a n ty F u n d A ssessm en ts
O hio, like all o th e r states except th e State of New York, has a post-insol
vency assessm ent d u e from all com panies doing business in O hio during the
y e ar o f an insolvency. This assessm ent is based on the insurer’s m arket share
during the year a failed com pany goes insolvent. R ecently, these assessments
w ere m inim al, but d u e to insolvencies outside of th e sta te of O hio during the
m id to late 1980s th ere w ere large assessm ents m ade against the surviving
com panies doing business in O hio. H ow ever, these assessm ents are cred
itable for the life insurance guaranty fund assessm ent against the premium
tax a t a rate o f 20 p ercen t a y ear for five years.24 T h ere is no corresponding
credit fo r property-liability insolvencies.

T a x A d m in is t r a t io n
T h e adm inistration o f this tax, unlike m ost o th e r taxes in O hio, is under
the jurisdiction o f the O h io D ep artm en t o f Insurance. For the domestic
com panies the D e p a rtm e n t o f Insurance calculates the tax payable based
u p o n the co m p an ies’ statu to ry filing o f inform ational returns with the
state.25 F or th e foreign com panies, the com panies them selves file a tax re
tu rn with the D e p a rtm e n t o f Taxation. As the dom estic com pany tax calcu
lation is ra th e r sim ple, it seem s efficient for the D ep a rtm en t o f Insurance to
calculate all d o m estic com pany taxes and send o u t bills.

C O M PA R ISO N W ITH O T H E R STATES
O h i o ’s I n s u r a n c e R e v e n u e s
O h io revenues from th e p rem ium tax have followed the national trend in
prem iu m taxes. Figure 12-3 shows th a t th e national tren d is increasing pre
m ium tax revenues for th e nation. In addition, the percentage change over
tim e is roughly th e sam e for bo th the state o f O hio and the o th er states. This
im plies the O h io insurance tax revenue stream follows th at of the rest of the
country. This is to be expected, since the states have very sim ilar tax policies
tow ards insurance.
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The growth in O h io ’s prem ium tax revenues seem ed to be less responsive
to changes in the insurance industry in com parison to the nationw ide growth
in prem ium tax revenues from the 1960s until the middle 1980s. From 1986
until the present, the growth rates are very close and likely reflect the in
creasing efficiency o f th e insurance m arket. T he cycle in tax revenue growth
shown in Figure 12-4 is likely due to the cyclicality o f the insurance m arket.26
The well-known cycles in the property-liability industry are the subject of
tremendous academ ic and industry d ebate as to their cause. However, no
matter the cause o f cycles, they have an im pact on revenue growth for the
state, making revenue forecasts d ep en d en t on the insurance cycle.
The elasticities shown in Figure 12-5 are the percentage changes in p re
mium tax as over th e percentage changes in p er capita income during the
time period. T he prem ium tax income elasticity shows the stability of the tax
revenues in changes b rought about by recessions and expansions. Taxes are
relatively stable if th e incom e elasticity is constant o r rising during a reces
sion, and is constant o r decreasing in an expansion. O ne can observe peaks
during recessions, and decreases o r relatively constant elasticities during ex
pansions. In total, how ever, the insurance industry’s prem ium taxes provide
a relatively stable source of income to the state, even accounting for the in
surance profit cycle.

Co m p a r is o n o f T a x B u r d e n w i t h O t h e r S t a t e s
Most states tax the insurance industry w ith just a prem ium tax. A n other

1964

1968

1973

1977

1981

1985

1989

i B T o u l U.S. Revenues A Ohio Revenues |

Source: Insurance Inform ation, Property-Casualty Factbook (various years)

FIGURE 12-3. United States and Ohio premium taxes.
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Source: Insurance Information Institute, Property-Casualty Factbook (various years.)

FIGURE 12-4. Total United States and Ohio prem ium tax revenues (%
changes).

Source: Authors calculations from Ohio Department o f Revenue, Annual Report (1992)

FIGURE 12-5. Premium tax income elasticity.
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group o f states uses a com bination o f a prem ium tax and an income tax, with
a credit for o th e r taxes paid. For exam ple, if a state had both an incom e tax
and a prem ium tax, it could offer a credit for the incom e tax paid on the in
come tax for prem iu m taxes paid. A lternatively, it could offer a credit on the
premium tax for incom e taxes paid. H ow ever, as illustrated in Table 12-4, the
premium tax is likely to be m uch g re a te r than the incom e tax.
T here are a n u m b e r of ways to co m p are the taxation o f the insurance
industry betw een states. First, one could look at the o th e r sta te ’s tax rates.
This is shown in A ppendix Table 12A-1 for the life industry, Table 12A-2
for the property-liability insurance industry, Table 12A-3 for the health in
surance industry, an d Table 12A-4 fo r th e annuity industry. O h io ’s nom i
nal rate is am ong th e higher rates for b o th the life and h ealth industries
and the property-liability industry as O h io ’s tax rate for an im portant part
of the industry is 2.5 percent. This is relatively high as there are only a
handful o f states w ith higher rates.27 E xam ining th e tax rate tells only part
of the story, especially in a state like O h io w here a significant portion of
the industry pays the lesser capital and surplus tax. T hus, exam ining the e f
fective tax rate provides a different inform ation ab o u t th e distribution of
the tax.
Effective tax rate. T h ere are a num ber o f ways of m easuring the tax b u r
den on the O hio insurance industry. T he first is to com pare the effective rate
for O hio versus o th e r sates’ effective rates. Table 12-5 shows the effective

TABLE 12-4
Effective N et Incom e Tax R ates for Various O hio In d ustries
(In P ercent)

Year

Insurance
Industry

Retail Trade

Electronics

Banking

1987

21.20

5.80

5.30

6.10

1988

16.90

5.30

5.20

6.00

1989

14.30

5.40

5.10

6.10

1990

16.70

5.10

5.00

6.50

1991

15.60

4.60

6.90

6.10

1992

17.00

6.20

5.00

5.20

Source: Price-Waterhouse and Levin and Driscoll, Comparative Analysis of the Taxation
of the Insurance Industry in Ohio, 1987-1992. (1994)
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rates based on 1991 d a ta for m ajor insurance states and states near Ohio
th a t could conceivably com pete with O hio.
In 1991 the n atio nal effective rate was 1.78 p ercent, while the Ohio ef
fective rate was 1.59.2S T h e effective rate for O hio seem s low. This is because
the dom estic industry has the opportu n ity of paying the lower o f the fran-

TABLE 12-5
Effective Tax R ates for Im p o rtan t
In su ra n c e S tates an d Ohio N eighbors

State

Effective
Tax Rate
On Percent)

Number of
Domestic
Companies in
1991

California

2.656

220

Connecticut

1.887

70

Florida

1.142

139

Illinois

0.896

366

Iowa

1.501

228

Indiana

1.160

174

Kentucky

4.046

58

Massachusetts

1.707

68

Michigan

1.193

92

New York

1.336

316

Ohio

1.588

209

Pennsylvania

1.300

264

Texas

1.931

492

Wisconsin

0.958

222

U.S.

1.728

6002

Source'. ACIR (1993). Note the figures do not include the retaliatory tax.
In 1991 if the retaliatory tax had been included the effective rate would have
been approximately 1.87.
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chise tax o r the prem ium tax, and this reduces the effective tax rate o f the
Ohio insurance industry. If everyone paid the actual tax rate of 2.5 percent
then the effective rate would be close to 2.5 percent. O th e r states in the re 
gion, such as M ichigan, W isconsin, O hio, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and Illinois,
have lower effective rates while Kentucky seems to be the only state within
the region to have a higher effective tax rate. Illinois, an im portant insurance
state with a very low effective rate, does not tax its dom estic industry with a
premium tax. Similarly, M ichigan’s low effective rate is attributed to its low
tax rate. However, it should be noted th at there is an additional tax not ac
counted for in these firms. This tax is the retaliatory tax which is discussed
further below. T his retaliatory tax is paid by the dom estic com panies to
other states. E stim ates o f the retaliatory tax for the O hio insurance industry
place it at over $50-60 million p e r year.
A nother way is to look at the p er capita burden. This is shown in Table
12-6 for a num b er o f years. Table 12-6 contains a great deal of inform ation,
but what it shows is th a t O hio is u n d er taxing the insurance industry on a per
capita basis relative to the national average, but th at over time O hio’s per
capita tax burd en has been increasing. Am ong its neighbors, O hio is b et
tered only by Illinois and M ichigan, which is a direct function of these states’
tax policies: Illinois does not tax its dom estics and M ichigan has a low rate.
In 1989 O hio ran k ed 42nd but, by 1992 O h io ’s rank had increased to 39th. At
the sam e tim e th e U n ited States average rank fell from 23 to 27. Thus,
Ohio’s burden as m easured on a p er capita basis, while less than the national
average, is increasing relative to the nation as a whole. A gain, however, the
retaliatory tax is not included. In 1991, if the O hio industry’s paym ents to
other states w ere included, the p e r capita burden would increase by just over
$4. This would increase O h io ’s rank by about 10.
A nother way to determ ine a relative tax burden is to look at a standardized
tax base across states and a standardized tax rate across states. Using the tax
base and the tax rate one can determ ine a standardized “capacity.” By com 
paring actual revenues received by the state for a particular tax to the capac
ity determ ined by th e standardized tax base and standardized tax rate, one can
then determ ine w hether a state is over- o r under-taxing its capacity.
This m ethodology is w hat the Advisory Com m ission on Intergovern
mental R elations (A C IR ) uses in its study o f state tax structures. For the in
surance industry th e standardized tax base is gross w ritten prem ium s and the
standardized rate is 1.73 percent (representing the U nited States average tax
rate). Figure 12-6 shows that in 1991 O hio under-utilized its capacity rela
tive to the national average. H ow ever, with the exception of California,
Connecticut, K entucky and Texas, the rem aining states are also u n d er-u ti
lizing th eir capacities. In fact, o th er than Kentucky, O hio has the highest ca
pacity utilization relative to its neighbors.
The figure should be in terp reted w ith care, however, because like the ef
fective tax rate, th e A C IR ’s m ethodology does not say anything about the

T otal
(in $000s)

Per
C apita

U.S.

7.340.691

California

1990

1991

23

7.369.604

1.314.750

45.24

5

Connecticut

175.898

54.31

Florida

250.144

19.74

Illinois

255.057

21.88

43

166.758

14.59

51

Indiana

103.436

18.49

49

107.516

19.39

47

84.878

29.89

22

86.976

31.32

22

Kentucky

151.199

40 57

7

187.573

50.90

3

Michigan

76.601

8 26

52

78.647

8 46

52

175,973

Minnesota

120.639

27.71

29

122.486

28.00

33

New York

582.240

32.44

17

699.529

38 88

10

Ohio

252,271

23.13

42

255,149

23.52

41

Pennsylvania

225.229

27 84

28

352.261

29.65

27

Texas

441.550

25.99

35

524.901

30.90

76.693

15.76

50

76.882

15.72

Iowa

Wisconsin

Per
C apita

29.63

28

7.721.145

1.170.831

39 34

9

1

170,163

51.77

47

322.915

24.87

1992

Rank

Total
(in $000s)

Per
C apita

Rank

30.69

24

7,875.621

30.88

27

1.287.740

42.39

9

1.173.297

38.01

13

2

174.122

52.91

3

160.843

49.02

7

40

319,567

24.07

41

311,977

23.13

42

192.876

16.71

51

197,720

17.00

51

121,809

21.71

44

122.788

21.69

44

92,288

33.02

18

97.447

34.54

18

214,688

57.82

1

206,917

55.10

2

18.26

49

178,304

18.89

48

129,618

29.25

29

130,617

29.16

33

594,889

32 94

19

610.046

33.67

24

269,929

24.68

40

281,301

25.54

39

362.473

30.30

25

404,806

33.71

22

24

595.446

34.32

15

516,081

29.23

22

50

83,278

16.81

50

68,975

13.78

52

Source: Stale Government Finances (various year»); Bureau of the Census Population Projections. 1990-2020, and Insurance Information Institute Factbook (1994). Note that the per
capita tax burdens do not include the retaliatory tax. O hio's burden would be increased by $4.50 per person in 1991 if retaliatory taxes were included.

REFORM

29.57

Rank

Total
(in $000s)

TAX

Per
C apita
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Total
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TABLE 12-6
In su ran ce Tax an d P er C ap ita In su ra n ce Tax Revenues by S tate, 1989-1992
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15000

200.00

ISO.OO

100.00

50 00

0.00

Source: ACIR, (1993).

FIGURE 12-6. Percentage o f insurance tax capacity (United States average =
100%).

distribution o f th e tax b urden betw een foreign and dom estic com panies and
between large an d sm all com panies. In addition, it docs not include the re 
taliatory tax. A lso, O h io provides a tax differential for small (and potentially
mid-sized) dom estics th at significantly reduces their tax burden, leaving
large dom estics an d foreign com panies with a higher burden.
Figure 12-7 also shows the behavior o f im portant insurance states and
neighbors o f O h io taxation of insurance capacity during the last decade.
Over time, O h io ’s taxation o f the insurance industry has rem ained constant,
as the rate ap p ears close to 100 percent during the years studied by the
ACIR. Illinois, Ind ian a, Florida, and W isconsin also experienced relatively
constant tax policies over time. States with a large variation over tim e, such
as Kentucky and Texas, are changing their insurance tax policies and this is
reflected in the w ide variation o f the use o f capacity. O f the states shown in
Figure 12-7 only Iowa has experienced a declining trend. This is likely due
to its desire to en co u rag e the developm ent o f the Iowan insurance industry.

M A IN ISSU ES A N D PRO BLEM S
T h e P r o s a n d C o n s o f P r e m i u m T a x a t io n
Why use a prem ium tax? As m entioned above, a prem ium tax is a rela
tively simple tax. In general, a com pany merely adds up its gross w ritten pre-
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FIGURE 12-7. Percentage o f tax capacity fo r insurance premium tax.

m ium s and applies a tax rate to d eterm in e the tax bill. This is a very simple
process for the com pany and a sim ple tax for the state to adm inister and
audit. In addition, th e prem iu m tax generally p roduces a steadily increasing
source of revenue.
A n o th e r reason a prem ium tax is preferable to o th e r taxes is that the
states have a long history o f using this tax and th e re have been few com
plaints. A lternatives such as th e incom e tax are difficult (in theory) to im
p le m e n t. T h u s, sim plicity, h isto rical in ertia, and the difficulty of
im plem entation o f alterative taxes are the m ajor reasons to keep and use the
prem ium tax.
Why States should not use a Premium Tax. T h ere are a num ber of reasons
to avoid using a prem ium tax, as outlin ed by Skipper.29 First, the premium
tax is regressive, m eaning that the low er-incom e insured pay a higher por
tion o f th eir incom e in these taxes than do the higher-incom e insured.
Second, since cash value life insurance can be a m ethod of savings, a pre
m ium tax on cash value life insurance is a tax on savings, which can reduce
the incentive to save o r provide incentives for the consum er to purchase a
savings pro d u ct from a n o th e r financial service provider.30

»1
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T hird, the p rem iu m tax is regressive against age, h ealth status, risk clas
sification, and occupation. F or exam ple, old er consum ers pay higher p re 
miums for life insurance and non-group health insurance. T hus, older
people pay a h ig h er p roportion of th eir income in prem ium taxes than do
the younger insured. T he reverse is tru e for auto policies, as young people
are considered h ig h er au to risks and thus pay m ore prem ium taxes relative
to o lder drivers. In addition, th e insured who are in p o o r health o r in haz
ardous occupations pay higher h ealth and disability prem ium s relative to
those in b e tte r h ealth and low er-risk occupations. Finally, people who live
in high-risk areas, such as rural areas w ithout nearby fire dep artm en ts o r
those in areas m o re pro n e to n atu ral disasters, will pay m ore in prem ium
taxes as th eir prem ium s will be higher than those o f people living in lowrisk areas.
Fourth, consum ers w ho purchase small policies pay m ore taxes p e r unit
of insurance th an those who purchase larger policies. This is because p re 
miums are set to cover th e cost o f th e risk plus the cost o f adm inistering and
maintaining th e policy. This adm inistration expense is a fixed cost, and for
small policies p ercen tag e of the prem ium is relatively high com pared to
larger policies. T his m akes the small policy (which contains a higher pro
portion of expense costs relative to risk costs) b ear a larger p er insurance
unit cost of the prem ium tax.
Fifth, there are a num ber of insurance substitutes, m ost notably self-in
surance, which a re not taxed. In O hio, this is m ore likely to be a problem in
the health insurance area. A com pany could potentially reduce its health
care expenses by 2.5 percent by self-insuring. This could be a non-trivial ex
pense for health care coverage.
T he availability o f tax-free self-insurance may cause the insured to opt
out of the m arket in tim es o f insurance shortages like th a t experienced in the
liability lines durin g the mid-1980s. As prem ium s are bid up, consum ers will
reduce their p u rchases of insurance and self-insure.
Sixth, the prem iu m tax also has problem s when th ere is differential taxa
tion betw een foreign and dom estic com panies. U n d e r O h io ’s tax law, com 
panies may be able to benefit from a lower effective tax rate through the
capital and surplus franchise tax. Sm aller com panies are not likely to be as
efficient as larger com panies because o f the trem endous econom ies o f scale
in the insurance industry. Thus, the tax preference can protect inefficient
domestic firms from com petition in the free and open m arket. In addition,
since capital and surplus are not apportioned to all states w here an insurer
operates, the tax b reak benefits and encourages single state com panies, thus
concentrating ra th e r the spreading risk.31
Finally, the prem iu m tax m ust be paid irrespective o f w hether the in
surer earns a p rofit. T his m eans the tax is regressive against start-up firms
those th at are losing m oney. O h io ’s tax law provides an alternative tax for
small com panies th ro u g h the capital and surplus franchise tax. Since this
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tax typically ben efits sm aller com panies, a large insurer th at is in financial
difficulty is h u rt by the p rem iu m tax and this can affect the risk of insol
vency.
T h e prem ium tax is regressive against profits, and Table 12-5 shows the
effect of this regressivity by com paring effective tax rates based on net in
com e for som e industries in O hio. N eubig (1994) uses a sim ulation to com
p u te effective tax rates for a num ber o f industries.32 T he tax rate is
significantly h ig h er for the insurance industry than for o th e r selected indus
tries in O hio. H ow ever, these o th e r industries (with the exception of bank
ing) are also subject to a sales tax and thus the com parison is not as clean.
T h e best com parison would be betw een the two financial service industries:
banking and insurance. T h e difference h ere is 200-300 percent each year.
Since banks do com pete against insurers and o th er financial institutions,
horizontal equity requires th a t com petitors be treated equally.
B ecause o f th e n atu re o f th e insurance tax system in O hio and the other
states, th ere should be two m ajo r effects on O hio com panies o f changing
the prem ium tax rate. T h e first is th at taxes payable to the state of Ohio
change, and th e second is th a t taxes payable to o th e r states by O hio com
p anies change d u e to the o p e ra tio n o f th e retaliatory tax. A tax increase, for
exam ple, w ould increase th e prem iu m taxes due to O hio as well as the pre
m ium taxes d u e by O hio insu rers to states with lower prem ium tax rates.
Sim ilarly, a d e crease in tax ra te s would low er O hio prem ium tax collections
as well as low ering prem iu m taxes paid to o th e r states for retaliatory pur
poses, but m ay cause an increase in retaliatory taxes collected from foreign
com panies.

SIM U L A T IO N O F O H IO ’S
IN S U R A N C E TAX ST R U C T U R E
This section is divided in to th ree parts. First, we exam ine the effect of
changing taxes o n the insurance industry exam ining the effects on both the
life and non-life industries. Second, we exam ine the effect o f a tax changes
on the life an d h ealth industry. Finally, we exam ine the effect o f the retalia
tory tax on th e O h io dom estic industry and the resulting revenue change to
the state.

T h e P r o p e r t y - L i a b i l i t y I n d u s t r y S i m u l a t io n
Table 12-7 shows the results o f a sim ulation of changing the tax rate on
the property-liability industry. T he sim ulation shows th at the domestic tax
revenue falls as the p rem ium tax is reduced from 2.5 percent to 2.0 percent.
As the tax rate falls, prem ium s are taxed at a lower rate. T hose companies
th at can pay th e low er prem iu m tax will do so. However, the franchise tax is
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TABLE 12-7
P roperty-L iability In d u stry Sim ulation R esults, 1992
A. Property-Liability Simulation o f C hanging Premium Tax Structure Holding Capital and
Surplus Franchise Tax constant (in $ millions).
A lternative P rem iu m T ax Rates
2.00%

2.25%

9.53

2.50%

2.75%

3.00%

Dom estic C om panies
Premium Tax Revenues

8.56

Franchise Tax Revenues

25.38

Total Domestic Tax Payable

33.94

Num ber o f Com panies Paying Franchise Tax

67

68

10.50

11.37

12.40

25.49

25.57

25.74

25.74

35.02

36.07

37.11

38.14

70

73

73

Foreign C om panies
Premium Tax Revenues

85.26

94.45

104.36

114.57

124.80

Toul

119.20

129.47

140 43

151.68

162.94

B. Property-Liability Capital and Surplus Franchise T ax Simulation Holding Premium Tax Rate
Constant (in S millions)
A lternative C a p ital and Surplus F ran ch ise T ax Rates
0.20%

0.30%

0.60%

0.70%

0.80%

0.90%

16.68

22.82

27.42

31.80

36.07

40.33

44.56

48.39

51.48

Franchise Tax Revenues
on Capita! and Surplus

15.19

14.39

17.64

21.46

25.57

29.62

33.85

27.45

30.54

Number o f Firm s Paying
C&S Tax

86

80

76

73

70

67

67

62

62

Premium Tax Revenues

1.49

Number o f Firms Paying
Premium Tax

21

8.43
27

0.40%

0.50%

Total Domestic Tax
Revenues

1.00%

9.78

10.34

10.5

10.71

10.71

20.94

20.94

31

34

37

40

40

45

45

Note: C urrent tax scenario highlighted in grey.

still in effect and th e re is little change in the num ber o f com panies paying
the franchise tax o v er th e prem ium tax as shown in Panel B..
As the tax ra te increases the am ount of tax payable to O hio increases,
with the increase com ing from the increase in the p rem ium tax. For the fo r
eign com panies, the change in the prem ium tax directly affects the prem ium
tax due. As the rate increases, the revenues increase proportionally, w hile if
the rate is d ecreased the revenue decreases similarly.
L i f e I n s u r a n c e I n d u s t r y S i m u l a t io n
Table 12-8 shows the life insurance sim ulation results. T he results are
similar to those o f th e property-liability sim ulation. As the prem ium tax rate
increases, th e n u m b er of com panies paying the franchise tax increases
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TABLE 12-8
Life In su ra n c e Sim ulation R esults
H olding F ran ch ise R ate C o n stan t (In M illions)
A. Prem ium Tax Simulation for the Life Insurance Industry.
A lternative P re m iu m T ax Rates
2.00%

2.25%

2.50%

2.75%

3.00%

D om estic C om panies
Prem ium Tax Revenues

8.01

8.9 0

9.55

4.78

2.88

Franchise Tax Revenues

1.87

1.98

2.27

8.19

9.9 6

Total Domestic Tax Payable

9.88

10.88

11.82

12.97

12.84

N um ber o f Com panies Paying Franchise Tax

29

28

27

23

22

F oreign C om panies
Premium Tax Revenues

99.34

111.76

124.18

136.60

149.02

Total

109.22

122.64

136 00

149.57

161.86

B Franchise Tax Simulation Results for the Life Insurance Industry
A ltern a tiv e C a p ital a n d S u rp lu s F ran ch ise Tax Rates
0.20%

0.30%

0.40%

0.50%

0.60%

0.70%

0.80%

090%

Total Domestic Tax
Revenues

5.00

7.01

8.80

10.33

11.84

11.19

11.47

11.70

11.93

Franchise Tax Revenues
on Capital and Surplus

0.58

1.39

2.12

3.79

2.29

9.03

9.65

9.6 5

9.65

32

32

30

27

24

21

17

13

5.62

6.68

6.54

9.55

2.1 6

1.82

2.05

2.28

17

28

25

22

19

17

17

17

N um ber o f Firm s Paying
C& S Tax
Premium Tax Revenues
N um ber o f Firm s Paying
Premium Tax

32

4.42
17

1.00%

Note: C urrent tax scenario highlighted in grey.

slightly and th e to tal am o u n t o f revenue increases slightly. As the rate in
creases, how ever, th e p rem ium tax becom es the lesser o f the capital tax and
prem iu m tax revenues decline. Franchise tax revenues increase almost
eno u g h to offset th e loss o f th e prem ium tax revenues when the rate in
creased to 3.0 p ercent. For th e foreign com panies the rate changes directly
affect the p rem iu m tax bill. A s the rate increases th e foreign prem ium tax
bill increases an d as the ra te decreases the foreign tax bill decreases.
P rem ium tax changes have a larger revenue affect in the foreign market
th em in the dom estic m arket.
Panel B o f th e Table 12-8 show s the effect of changing the capital and sur
plus rate on th e revenues collected from the dom estic industry. T he c u r r e n t
ra te is 0.6 p ercen t. R eductions in the rate cause th e num ber o f c o m p a n i e s
paying the capital and surplus tax to increase and the am ount collected by
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both the prem ium tax and the capital and surplus franchise tax to decrease.
As the franchise tax ra te increases, the num ber of firms paying the franchise
tax decreases, but the franchise tax revenues increase dram atically. In con
trast, as the tax ra te increases the prem ium tax bill falls as m ore is collected
through the franchise tax. O verall, the total tax bill from dom estics increases
as the franchise tax rate increases from 0.2 percent to 1.0 percent, but at the
cusp o f moving from 0.6 percent to 0.7 percent, the total am ount of tax d e 
creases slightly. T his is due to the fact th at the mixture o f com panies paying
the franchise tax changes dram atically. C ertain com panies with previously
large prem ium tax bills are now paying a slightly lower franchise tax.

R e t a l ia t o r y T a x S i m u l a t io n
The retaliatory tax due to O hio is relatively small, am ounting to approxi
mately $2.5 million in 1993 and representing 0.9 percent o f the total fran 
chise and p rem iu m tax bill for insu ran ce com panies. H ow ever, the
retaliatory tax paid by O hio com panies to the rest of the states is substantial.
Through a sim ulation o f the retaliatory tax provision o f O h io ’s insurance tax
law it was determ in ed th a t at the cu rren t rate, O hio com panies paid ap
proximately $58 billion to o th e r states. Table 12-9 shows the results o f the
simulation. As th e rate is reduced from the curren t 2.5 percent, we see an in
crease in the am o u n t collected by O hio. T he am ount collected does not

TABLE 12-9
R etaliatory Tax Sim ulation (In M illions)

Collected by
Ohio

Paid to Other States

Rate

Total

Life

PropertyLiability

Total

2.50

2.54

12.38

46.00

58.38

2.25

3.26

8.20

26.38

34.58

2.00

5.32

4.66

10.85

15.51

1.75

19.79

2.65

5.43

8.08

1.50

34.72

1.33

2.53

3.86

1.35

43.72

0.66

0.77

1.42

Note: Current tax situation is highlighted in grey.

616

A B L U E P R I N T F O R TAX R E F O R M

seem to increase dram atically until the rate falls below 2.0 percent. This is
to be expected, since the U n ited States average rate is slightly less than 2.0
percent. In addition, as the rate falls the am ount paid to o th e r states de
creases. This is also expected, as the states’ retaliatory provisions require
paym ent only if the hom e state taxes at a higher am ount. Thus, O hio com
panies would benefit dram atically as a result of a reduction in the rate.

R E F O R M O PT IO N S A N D IM PLICATIONS
O p t io n s f o r R e f o r m
Equalize foreign and domestic rates. By trading all foreign and domestic
com panies sim ilarly it w ould be possible to lower the effective tax rate. This
is show n in Table 12-10. Table 12-10 has the total prem ium s w ritten for the
O hio insurance industry. F or the first com parison, by adding up all the life
prem ium s (n e t o f annuities) and including th e fraternal life prem ium s to the
sum o f property-casualty prem ium s (n et o f H M O prem ium s) and dividing
this by the total prem ium and franchise tax collected, the revenue neutral
rate would by 1.83 percen t in 1993. This is shown as R atio 1. O ver the last
five years R atio 1 has been relatively stable ranging betw een 1.77 percent to
1.83 percent. A dding the fire m arshall and retaliatory tax collections into the
n u m e ra to r yields R atio 2. T hus, the revenue neutral level of insurance taxa
tion would be 1.87 percen t in 1993. This am ount has ranged between 1.85
1.90 percent in th e last five years.
N ote that R a tio 2 rate is biased upw ard. This is due to the operation of
the retaliato ry tax. A t a rate o f 1.90 percent, the O hio rate will be lower than
th e national average and potentially significant retaliatory tax revenues will
accrue. T hese additional revenues could then be em ployed to lower the ef
fective rate fu rth e r, which in turn will gen erate a fu rth er collection of retal
iatory taxes. Table 12-9 shows th at by moving from a rate of 2.50 percent to
a ra te o f say, 1.75 p ercen t will yield alm ost $20 m illion in retaliatory collec
tions. T hose effected by equalizing the rate would be those in the domestic
industry paying th e capital an d surplus tax. T hese are predom inantly small
property-liability com panies and the Blues. H ow ever, the larger companies
o p eratin g in in te rsta te m ark ets would benefit trem endously because the re
taliatory tax b u rd e n w ould be dram atically reduced. At an effective rate ap
proaching 1.35 p ercen t o u r sim ulation predicts a n et gain of $43 m illiondue to foreign com pany paym ents o f retaliatory taxes due to Ohio.
Equalize tax treatment between HMOs and health insurers. By exempting
all health insurers and H M O s from paying the prem ium o r franchise tax,
th ere w ould be a loss o f revenue. If we w ere to use a rate applicable to all
o th e r insurers, th e effective rate on gross prem ium s w ritten net of policy
ho ld er dividends would be approxim ately 1.64 percent (in Ratio 2A). This is

T A B L E 1 2 -1 0

C alculated Effective R ates from Broadening the Tax Base and Taxing All Prem ium s Equally
1992

1991

1990

1989

$7,497,835,000

$7,194,570,066

$7,169,898,105

$6,565,924,100

- Domestic annuity considerations

178,219,000

221,949,000

183,739,076

125,871,164

143,772,221

-Foreign annuity considerations

1,440,366,000

1.473,470,000

1.515,980,025

1,625,038,500

1,472.956,281

+ all Fraternal Premiums

223,328,000

249,892.000

197,718,328

168,791,724

148,232,527

Net Life Premiums

7,686,465,000

6,052,308,000

5,692,569,293

5,587,780,165

5,097,428,125

Total PC Premiums

12,285,361,000

11,554,705,000

11,069,768.005

10,670,968,663

10,029,780,202

-Domestic HMOs

2,378,568,000

2,183,931,000

1,900.930.864

1,593,099,358

1,317,552,690

-Foreign HMOs

88,315.000

43,787.000

82.547,481

85,341,646

30,687.230

9,818,478,000

9,326,987,000

9,086,289.660

8.992,527,659

8,681,540.282

17,504,943,000

15,379.295.000

14,778,858.953

14.580.307,824

13,778,968,407

Total Premium & Franchise Tax collected

319,565,254

282,668,411

270,980,387

259,462,913

244,254,539

Total Premium, Franchise, Fire Marshall & Retaliatory Taxes

327,357,383

291,489,583

280,947,009

270,274,666

255,056,067

(1) Ratio of Premium and Franchise Taxes to Total Net

1.83%

1.84%

1.83%

1.78%

1.77%

(2) Ratio of All taxes to Total Premiums

1.87%

1.90%

1.90%

1.85%

1.85%

(1A) Ratio 1 with HMOs Paying Premium Tax

1.60%

1.61%

1.62%

1.60%

1.61%

(2A) Ratio 2 with HMOs Paying Premium Tax

1.64%

1.66%

1.68%

1.66%

1.69%

Net PC Prems
Total Net Premiums (Net Life + Net PC)

the State of Ohio as a result of lowering the effective rate. Inclusion of such taxes will lower the effective rate.
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Source: Ohio Departmcnf of Insurance. Annual Report and unpublished data. Nole: Equalized tax rale does not include potential retaliatory taxes collected by
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$9,081,722,000

Total Life Premiums and Annuity Considerations
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still less than the cu rren t 2.5 percen t rate, and is lower than the national av
erage effective tax rate. In addition, the sim ulation o f the retaliatory tax
shows th at by reducing O h io ’s effect rate it is possible to increase O hio’s col
lections from th e retaliatory tax by m ore than $20 million. This could be
used to low er th e effective ra te further.
Employ an incom e tax on the insurance industry. Since the prem ium tax is
a tax on gross receipts ra th e r th an n et incom e th ere is a relatively large dif
ference betw een th e b u rd en on a corporation paying a net income tax and
the burden on an insurance com pany paying a prem ium tax, all o th er things
equal. Table 12-4 above shows th a t the effective incom e tax rate on the bank
ing industry is ab o u t one-third th a t on the insurance industry.
T he two industries should have approxim ately the sam e burden, as they
are sim ilar in m any respects. In 1992, for exam ple, the effective net income
tax rate was 17 percent. By reducing th at rate to w hat a non-financial cor
p o ra tio n pays, it w ould be possible to lessen the burden. However, the ef
fective tax rates shown in Table 12-4 do not include the effect o f sales or
o th e r property taxes, and th u s a strong argum ent can be m ade th at the ef
fective rate n eed n o t be red u ced to the 5-6 percen t range.
A n incom e tax could be im plem ented relatively well, as insurers currently
pay federal incom e taxes and, as with the non-financial corporations, Ohio
could piggy-back on the federal definition o f incom e. This would increase
horizontal equity, especially if o th e r financial institutions w ere taxed on an
incom e basis. T h e problem s w ith piggy-backing on the federal definition of
n et taxable incom e are three-fold. First, there is still som e deb ate over the
p ro p e r definition of incom e for an insurance com pany, and this debate be
com es even m o re technical d epending on th e organizational form of the in
su rer, .i.e. w h e th e r it is a stock o r m utual company. Second, by tying to the
federal d efinition, O hio takes all the poten tial problem s of defining income
and in co rp o rates them into its tax law. T hird, an im portant issue concerns
the a p p ro p ria te ap p o rtio n m en t form ula. Since insurers do not have large
am o u n ts o f p ro p erty , it m ay be ap p ro p riate to use a single factor formula
based on sales o r gross p rem ium s w ritten. M ost states with corporate in
com e taxes on insurance use this single factor ap p o rtionm ent formula. This
form ula would benefit dom estic insurance com panies for exactly the same
reasons that single sales ap p o rtio n m en t factor in the general corporate in
com e tax w ould benefit O hio corporations.
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A P P E N D IX A
PR E M IU M TAX RATES FO R V AR IO U S LINES
OF INSU RA N CES
TABLE 12A-1
Life In su ran ce Prem ium Tax Rates, 1993

State
Alabama (1)
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas 1 (1)
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
DC.
Florida
Georgia (1)
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana (5)

Domestic
Rate %

Foreign
Rate %

1.00
2.70
2.00
2.50
2.35
2.25
2.00
2.00
2.25
1.75
0.50
2.75
3.00
0.00
2.00
2.00
1.00
2.00
2.25
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.33
2.00
3.00
2.00
2.75

3.00
2.70
2.00
2.50
2.35
2.25
2.00
2.00
2.25
1.75
2.25
2.75
3.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.25
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.33
2.00
3.00
2.00
2.75

State
Nebraska
Nevada (2)
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico (1)
New York (6)
North Carolina (7)
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma (10)
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennesse (1)
T ex as(I)
Utah
Vermont
Virginia (2)
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin (8)
Wyoming

Source: CCH, State Tax Guide, ACLI
(1) Can reduce if investing in assets within the state.
(2) Domestic mutuals pay 1.00%.
(3) Franchise tax on all legal reserve mutuals based domestically.
(4) Franchise tax based upon authorized capital stock.
(5) Plus an additional 7.00% surcharge.
(6) Premium tax and income tax are payable up to 2.6% of premiums.
(7)7.25% for 1992.
(8) Domestic rate is graduated and increases to foreign.

Domestic
Rate %

Foreign
Rate %

1.00
3.50
2.00
2.01
3.00
0.80
1.90
2.00
2.50
2.25
2.25
2.00
2.00
0.75
2.50
1.75
2.40
2.25
2.00
2.25
2.00
3.00
2.00
1.60

1.00
3.50
2.00
2.01
3.00
0.80
1.90
2.00
2.50
2.25
2.25
2.00
2.00
0.75
2.50
2.00
2.40
2.25
2.00
2.25
2.00
3.00
2.00
1.60
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TABLE 12A-2
S tate P rem iu m Tax R ates on P&C C om panies, 1993

S late

Dom estic
R ate %

Foreign
Rate %

Fire
R ate’

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas (1)
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
DC.
R orida
G eorgia (2)
Hawaii
Idaho (2)
Il!inois(S>
Indiana (2)
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana (4)
Maine
M aryland (2X6)
M assachusetts 12)
M ichigan (11)
Minnesota
Mississippi
M issouri (7)
M ontana (8)

4.00
2.70
2.00
2.50
2.35
2.25
2.00
1.75
2.25
1.75
2.25
4.70
3.00
0.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
3.50
1.25
2.00
2.00
2.28
1.33
2.00
3.00
2.00
2.75

1.00
2.70
2.00
2.50
2.35
2.25
2.00
2.00
2.25
1.75
0.50
4.70
1.60
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.00
3.50
1.25
2.00
2.00
2.28
1.33
2.00
3.00
2.00
2.75

+ 0 .0 8
+ 0 .0 8
2.20

2.00
1.00

2.50
2.50
2.00
4.25
2.00
3.00
2.00

State

Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico (2)
New York (12)
North Carolina (13)
North Dakota
Ohio(9)
Oklahoma (10)
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
T ex as(2)
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Domesti
c Rate
%

Foreign
R ate %

Fire
Rate

1.00
3.50
2.00
2.01
3.00
1.30
1.99
1.75
2.50
2.25
2.25
2.00
2.00
1.25
2.50
2.50
3.50
2.25
2.00
2.25
2.00
3.00
2.00
1.60

1.00
3.50
2.00
2.01
1.90
1.30
1.33
1.75
2.50
2.25
2.25
2.00
2.00
1.25
2.50
2.50
3.50
2.25
2.00
2.25
2.00
3.00
2.00
1.60

1.08

3.32
3.25
2.63
3.25

1

2.35
2.55
3.25

4.oo
2.38

4.00
3.75

Source: C C H , Multistate Tax Guide, NAIC. Retaliatory Tax Manual (1993).
'F ire marshall taxes are added on to fire related lines o f insurance. For states with differential rates between foreign and
dom estics, the rate is shown as an add on. for states with non discrimination between foreign and domestic, the rate shown is
the total and final rate.
(1) Retaliatory taxes are 0 for companies with 13% or m ore o f their assets in Arkansan owned companies.
(2) Qualified companies with investment in state can conceivably reduce to rate of domestics.
(3) Also corporate income tax (Indiana Financial Institutions Tax) o f 8.5% on AG1.
(4) Including retaliatory taxes.
(5) Domestics pay an income tax.
(6) No premium tax payable for domestic mutual fire companies.
(7) Small mutual taxed lower.
(8) There is an additional 7% surcharge on premiums.
(9) Fire rate is maximum possible fire rate. Fire rate is 0.75 percent times the amount o f fire business contained in the line.
(10) Can reduce up to 50% if company has home office in state
(11) M ichigan Single Business Tax taxes premiums at 1.33%.
(12) Domestics pay 1 percent on gross investment income.
(14) Domestic fire pays 2.66

;
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TABLE 12A-3
H ealth In su ran ce on A nnuity Prem ium s, 1993

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
DC.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota (7)
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana(l)

Domestic
R ate %

Foreign
R ate %

1.00
2.70
2.00
2.50
2.35
2.25
2.00
2.00
2.25
1.75
2.25
4.70
3.00
0.00
2.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
2.25
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.33
2.00
3.00
2.00
2.75

3.00
2.70
2.00
2.50
2.35
2.25
2.00
2.00
2.25
1.75
2.25
4.70
3.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.00
2.25
2.00
2.00
2.00
1.33
2.00
3.00
2.00
2.75

Blue Cross
Exemption*

Yes

Yes
Yes

State
Nebraska (2)
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey (3)
New Mexico
New York (4)
North Carolina
(8)
North Dakota
Ohio (9)
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin (5)
Wyoming (6)

Domestic
R ate %

fo re ig n
Rate %

0.50
3.50
2.00
1.05
3.00
0.80
1.90
1.75
2.50
2.25
0.00
2.00
2.00
1.25
2.50
1.75
2.40
2.25
2.00
2.25
2.00
3.00
0.0 0
1.60

0.50
3.50
2.00
1.05
3.00
0.80
1.90
1.75
2.50
2.25
2.25
2.00
2.00
1.25
2.50
2.00
2.40
2.25
2.00
2.25
2.00
3.00
0.00
1.60

Yes

Source: A C U . Premium Tax Manual.
•Not necessarily a complete list.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)

Also, surtax o f 7% (July 1. 1992 - June 30. 1993).
.5% represents "Group* rate, individual rate is 1 %.
1.05% represents 'G roup* rate. Individual rate is 2.1%.
Maximum tax liability is 2.6% o f premiums. Additional surcharge based on franchise tax.
Domestic companies pay no premium tax. but pay a 3.5% license fee on apportioned gross income.
Will be 1.2% in 1993. and .75% after 1994
Rate o f 1% on Blues commences in 1996.
Blues taxed at 0.50% .
Domestic companies pay the minimum of 2.5% gross premiums tax o r 0.6% Capital and surplus tax.

Blue Cross
Exem ption*

Yes

Yes
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TABLE 12A-4
S tate Tax R ates on Annuity Prem ium s, 1993
Tax R ate on
Qualified
Retirem ent
Plans

State

Tax
Rate %

Alabama

1.00

1.00

California

0.50

2.35

District of Columbia

2.25

2.25

Florida (1)

1.00

Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky

1.00
2.00
2.00

2.00

2.00

Maine

2.00

Mississippi

2.00

Nevada

3.50

North Carolina

1.90

South Dakota
West Virginia

1.25
1.00

Wyoming

1.00
1.00

Sources: CCH, State Tax Guide, and ACLI.
Note: All other states do no* tax annuity premiums.
(1) Exempt if tax savings is passed to customer

A P P E N D IX B
D E SC R IPT IO N O F T H E O H IO IN SU R A N C E TAX
SIM U L A TIO N PROCESS
D

e s c r ip t io n o f

S im

u l a t io n

The simulation of the insurance tax used the data compiled by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). These data are statutory filings
with the states and contain nearly all the information necessary to calculate a tax
payer’s actual tax liability.
D

o m e s t ic

C

o m p a n ie s

Using information provided by the Department of Insurance and the N a t i o n w i d e
Insurance Group, we calculated the domestic tax bill for each company in m u c h the
same way the Insurance Department would calculate it. A very few a s s u m p t i o n s
needed to be made in order to obtain the final tax total. First, there is a d e d u c t i o n
for ownership of stock in Ohio subsidiaries. These companies are not identified sep
arately in the annual statement, as only the total ownership interest in affiliates is r e 
ported. Thus, it was assumed after trial and error that '/2 of the affiliate i n v e s t m e n t s
were in Ohio companies.
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o m pa n y

S im
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u l a t io n

The simulation of foreign company tax returns was derived from the tax returns
for both the life and health and property-liability industries. All the necessary data
were contained on the NAIC statements.
F ir e M

arshall

T

ax

All necessary data were available on the NAIC tapes. Tax bills were then esti
mated using the tax returns.
R e t a l ia t o r y T a x

This is a much more difficult tax to estimate, as it requires using the rates and tax
base of every state with a lower tax bill. We assumed, to make the project treatable,
that each states rate was that reported in Tables A-l to A-4, and that the tax base in
each state was premiums written net of policyholder dividends. This seems to be a
very representative tax base, as most states allow for the deduction of policyholder
dividends.
The retaliatory tax calculation also includes assessments for insolvency funds and
license fees. These were assumed to be fixed and not to change according to changes
in rates. This is not necessarily a poor assumption, as the license fees are relatively
low and insolvency assessments change every year anyway, depending on the number
and size of companies. Recent insolvencies have been relatively small, and do not
add or detract from the simulation’s general results.

ENDNOTES
1. Data regarding the number of companies in each industry were obtained from the
ACLI’s Life Insurance Factbook for years 1964 to the present and from the Ill’s
Property Casualty Factbook for years 1964 to 1994.
2. Not all of the 200 or so Ohio companies are true home offices. There are a num
ber of companies that write a very small amount of business and thus do not con
tribute dramatically to employment opportunities in Ohio. In addition, there are
shell companies that may not write any business at all in a given year, but when the
parent company deems it necessary, may write business as needed. In addition, there
is another set of companies that may operate as captives of a traditional corporation.
These captive insurers may write insurance predominantly for the parent company.
3. These companies are Blue Cross-Blue Shield Mutual of Ohio, Central Benefits
Mutual Insurance Company, and Community Mutual Insurance company. Central
Benefits Mutual is no longer associated with the Blue Cross organization. Data are
from Ohio Department of Insurance, Annual Report (1992).
4. Ohio Department of Insurance, Annual Report (1992).
5. Open enrollment means that enrollment in an HMO is open to any consumer,
whether as part of a group or as an individual.
6- Community rating is the practice of rating for determination of premiums a group
based on the characteristics of a “community” rather than on the characteristics of
an individual.
See H.D. Skipper, (1987).
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8. Ohio. Rev. Stats. §§5725.18-.26
9. Ohio. Rev. Stats. §§5729.02
10. Ohio. Rev. Stats. §§5729.04. This is more likely relevant for mutuals as stock com
panies generally do not have participatory policies.
11. This is not necessarily a bad policy, as a health insurance company would not
need as much surplus as one that specialized in riskier and longer lines of business.
12. A number of states exempt the Blues, while others provide lower rates to health
insurers. Further, studies have shown that states with preferences for the Blues have
higher Blue market shares (see, e.g., Freeh and Ginsberg (1978)) whether more peo
ple are insured because of this preference has not been shown.
13. In addition to some state tax breaks health insurance enjoys a benevolent federal
tax policy. For employer sponsored health plans, the employer can deduct the entire
cost of the health plan from taxable income. Small business too can take advantage
of this deduction. On the individual basis, there is also a deduction if health expenses
including insurance are greater than 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income. As there
are a number of federal tax preferences for health insurance consumption, a state
should as part of its health care policy decide whether the additional benefits o f cov
erage are worth the fiscal costs of differential treatment.
14. There is an important cost to society from trading off open enrollment and com
munity underwriting for a tax break. This cost is one that is generally not discussed
outside of the insurance industry; it is the cost of adverse selection. High-risk indi
viduals (i.e., those having a higher than average probability of being sick in the next
year) can and will enroll (assuming they can otherwise pay for the coverage) in an
HMO, since the community rate is based on average characteristics of the commu
nity. By allowing unlimited entry of high risk insured and charging them a price not
reflecting their actual risk, the HM O’s losses increase. These losses are then (at
least) partially spread to the other members of the HMO. For insured who are on
the margin whether to purchase health insurance through an HMO or to go without
insurance, the open enrollment and community rating make the HMO coverage
more expensive and may cause individuals to go without coverage.
15. The states are AL, CA, DC, FL, ID, KS, ME, MS, NV, NC, SD, WV, and WY.
16. The states are ID, KS, ME, NV, NC, ND, and WY.
17. This number assumes all annuities are subject to the premium tax.
18. This determination of percentage of fire coverage was done by the Insurance
Services Office.
19. For a description of the state’s authority over insurance companies see Kenneth
Meyer, “The Political Economy of Insurance Regulation,” (Albany: SUNY Press,
1987).
20. The number of states that have blatantly discriminated between foreign and do
mestic companies has diminished since Metropolitan Life v. Ward, 470 United States
869 (1985) where the Supreme Court stated that it was permissible to discriminate
between foreign and domestic insurers under the equal protection clause of the
XlVth Amendment only if the state had a rational basis for doing so. Some states,
like Ohio and Georgia, still provide some domestics with a tax advantage. This will
be discussed further below.
21. See Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward, 470 United States 869 (1985).
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22. Massachusetts recognized this fact and decided to tax its domestic industry at a
higher rate that the foreign companies so the domestic industry would not have to
pay increased retaliatory taxes to other jurisdictions.
23. This could lead to a bizarre result if the right fact pattern exists. For example,
suppose there is a Kansas company (with a majority of its writings in Ohio) that fails.
Kansas’ premium tax rate is less than Ohio’s; thus a retaliatory tax must be paid to
Kansas by Ohio companies writing in Kansas. The tax paid by Ohio companies is in
creased because of the failure of a Kansas company. Thus, the Kansan treasury ben
efits from the insolvency of a Kansas firm due to the retaliatory tax paid by foreign
companies
24.0.R.C. §3956.20.
25. These informational returns are used to monitor the firm’s solvency and contains
information concerning premiums, losses, and expenses for the company.
26. See Martin Grace and Julie Hotchkiss, (1994), and Stewart, (1984).
27. The states with statutory rates higher than Ohio are AL, AK, HI, MT, and NV
for life insurance and AL, AK, HI, KY, NY, TX, and WV for property-liability in
surance. Note that with the exception of Texas, the state markets are relatively small.
Thus, Ohio is among the largest markets with a high tax rate.
28. The national effective rate is the sum of all premium taxes collected as a per
centage of total direct premiums written. Ohio’s effective rate is similarly calculated.
Data employed in these calculations and in Table 12-4 are from ACIR (1993). Note
that retaliatory taxes paid to other states are not included.
29. H. D. Skipper, (1987).
30. Ibid.
31. If these small companies engage in reinsurance to spread the risk, they are still
inefficient if a larger company would not have to engage in similar activities.
32. Price Waterhouse and Levin and Driscoll, (1994).

